Egyptian Competitiveness Observatory / Observatory / International Reports & Data

Africa and Egypt in the AfDB’s November 2026 outlook: growth, inflation and financing

Africa and Egypt in the AfDB’s November 2026 outlook: growth, inflation and financing

Africa’s Macroeconomic Performance and Outlook

November 2026 update
13 November 2026
African Development Bank Group
African Development Bank release page

Egypt and North Africa in the African Development Bank update

النسخة العربية

Higher growth forecasts coexist with persistent financing pressure

The African Development Bank’s 13 November 2026 update raises Africa’s growth forecast while energy disruption and financing costs are still weighing on its economies. North Africa illustrates the apparent tension. The Bank expects stronger growth and a narrower fiscal deficit than it did in May, alongside a wider current account deficit. The chapters explain how activity and the public budget can improve while economies still need external financing and face high debt-service costs. In Egypt the Bank connects its growth upgrade to a recovery in foreign-exchange-earning activities and stronger production, while projecting double-digit inflation.

The May comparisons below come from the November update itself. Some charts label the revised forecasts October. The publisher dates the edition 13 November. Future values are Bank projections, and 2025 is a historical reference or estimate depending on the series. The two Egypt forecasts retain the Bank’s 2026 label. The passages cited here leave their detailed reporting periods unresolved.

Key messages, pp. 1–2

Energy, weather and technology operate through different channels

The Bank puts disruption to energy supplies at the centre of the outlook. The effects depend on an economy’s place in energy trade and its ability to secure supplies. Higher export prices can improve an energy producer’s terms of trade. For importers, higher fuel prices raise the cost of shipping and production. Local-currency depreciation adds to the cost of imported fuel, fertiliser and food before those increases reach consumer prices. The Bank notes that stocks, alternative supply arrangements and cushioning measures limited some of this transmission in some economies.

The shock extends from the fuel bill into the agricultural season. Fertiliser disruption raises cultivation costs, while extreme weather threatens crops and infrastructure. The Bank links these channels to potential pressure on food prices, import needs and public support, particularly where households rely on imported staples. Technology investment supports growth elsewhere, but the Bank sees limited near-term gains for Africa where participation in higher-value activities remains narrow. Over a longer horizon the edition identifies opportunities where reliable power and digital infrastructure can improve productivity in domestic activities.

Forces driving the outlook, pp. 3–4

The sources of growth differ across Egypt, Morocco and the continent

The Bank projects African growth of 4.6% in 2026 and 4.5% in 2027, compared with 4.5% in 2025 in this edition. It puts the 2026 forecast 0.4 percentage points above May and reports upgrades in four of Africa’s five regions. It links part of the aggregate improvement to gains for exporters of energy and steps taken by importers to cushion the shock. By economic structure, the 2026 growth forecast for oil exporters rose from 4.2% to 4.6%. In tourism-dependent economies the Bank expects growth to slow from 4.0% in 2025 to 3.1% in 2026. It kept the latter forecast unchanged from May.

The Bank raised North Africa’s 2026 forecast from 4.0% to 4.7%, with five of its six economies expected to grow by at least 4%. Egypt’s forecast moved from 4.0% to 5.1%, an upgrade of 1.1 percentage points as reported by the Bank. Its explanation points to recovering Suez Canal activity, stronger manufacturing and tourism, and investment supporting jobs and information and communications technology exports. The chapter leaves individual activities’ contributions to that forecast revision unquantified.

Morocco’s forecast rose from 4.2% to 4.7%, supported by infrastructure investment and recovering farm output after winter rains. Mauritania’s moved from 4.4% to 4.5%. These examples put the regional figure in context. It brings together recovering shipping, services and industrial activity in Egypt with an agricultural rebound and infrastructure investment in Morocco. The slowdown projected for tourism-dependent economies also shows how a stronger tourism sector in the Bank’s explanation for Egypt can coexist with a weaker trajectory for that separate grouping.

Growth chapter and Figures 2.1 and 2.2, pp. 5–6

Lower inflation forecasts leave monetary authorities cautious

The Bank lowered projected average African consumer price inflation in 2026 from 10.4% in May to 9.5%, retaining its 8.9% forecast for 2027. It gives 13.4% for 2025. North Africa’s 2026 forecast fell from 9.9% to 9.5%. The identical updated figures mask different revisions for the region and the continent. The Bank attributes part of the containment to energy stocks, measures limiting pass-through and currency stability across a number of economies for much of the year.

The Bank projects inflation of 13.0% for Egypt under its 2026 label, placing it among 12 countries expected to experience double-digit inflation. The macroeconomic chapter reports an Egyptian benchmark policy rate of 19% in its account of the period covered. That is the November report’s account, with a different purpose from a current policy-rate quotation or a company borrowing rate. The Bank describes other policy paths, including tightening in South Africa in response to the oil shock and a rate cut in Nigeria as inflation moderated and foreign-exchange stability improved. A falling continental inflation forecast thus leaves scope for different monetary responses.

Monetary conditions also affect the external accounts and debt. The Bank explains how tighter global finance may weaken external demand and raise borrowing costs, while a stronger dollar increases the local-currency cost of servicing dollar obligations. Economies with near-term refinancing needs face added pressure when these conditions coincide with a higher fuel import bill.

Macroeconomic developments, pp. 7–9, Figure 3.1

A stronger fiscal outlook can coexist with a weaker external balance

The Bank projects Africa’s overall fiscal deficit, including grants, to narrow from an estimated 4.5% of GDP in 2025 to 4.3% in 2026 and 4.0% in 2027. Figure 3.3 shows May projections of 4.8% and 4.6% for those two forecast years. The Bank lowered North Africa’s 2026 fiscal deficit forecast from 7.8% to 5.7% of GDP, still the largest regional deficit in its presentation. West Africa’s projected deficit widened from 3.0% to 3.9% of GDP, illustrating the divergence in fiscal revisions.

On the external side the Bank places Africa’s 2026 current account deficit at 1.5% of GDP, compared with 1.7% in May. North Africa moved in the opposite direction, from a projected deficit of 2.9% to 3.2% of GDP. In West Africa the Bank now projects a surplus of 2.5% of GDP, up from 1.6% in May. The fiscal balance and the balance of current transactions with the rest of the world measure different things. They can move in opposite directions in the same region.

The report stresses that the aggregate external balance alone cannot establish the contributions of commodity prices, export volumes, import demand, income payments or transfers to a revision. Establishing what is being imported and how the deficit is financed requires more detail. The regional figures here refer to North Africa as a whole. Applying them to Egypt’s own accounts would require country-specific evidence.

Macroeconomic developments, pp. 9–10, Figure 3.3

A falling debt ratio leaves substantial debt service

The Bank reports that Africa’s public debt ratio fell from an average of 63.9% of GDP in 2023–2024 to 62.6% in 2025, and projects 60.7% in 2030. Figure 4.1 explains how nominal output growth enlarges the denominator. If nominal GDP grows faster than the effective interest rate, the differential helps reduce the existing debt ratio. The final path also depends on the primary balance, changes in the value of liabilities and other stock-flow adjustments. The Bank links the projected path to stronger primary balances and possible support from restructuring in some countries. It attributes part of the aggregate decline to developments in South Africa, Sudan and Ghana.

At the same time, the report describes a shift from concessional funding towards external commercial borrowing, including international bonds and bank loans, alongside greater reliance on domestic borrowing in some countries. It reports external debt service of 31% of government revenue in 2024, up from 23.7% in 2017. External interest payments alone amounted to 6.3% of government revenue in 2024. The denominator here is government revenue, while the stock of debt above is measured against GDP. The periods are also distinct: the debt-service figures refer to 2024, and the debt-stock path includes a projection for 2030.

As of July 2026 the Bank places 14 African countries at high risk of debt distress and eight already in distress. Restructuring can ease maturity pressures, the report explains, while slow resolution prolongs uncertainty. The repayment calendar therefore matters. The debt ratio can improve over several years even as principal payments, interest and other public spending needs come due together in a particular year.

Public debt and vulnerabilities, pp. 11–13, Figure 4.1

Supply and financing risks coexist with opportunities in regional trade

The Bank describes the balance of risks as broadly even while identifying substantial downside risks. Persistent shipping disruption can raise import costs as stocks run down, and extreme weather increases the risk of weaker harvests and higher food prices. Uncertainty about trade policy can delay investment. Higher risk premiums can make refinancing more expensive or harder to obtain. The Bank describes a path in which those pressures reinforce each other if the currency and reserves come under strain while the government faces large funding needs.

On the upside, the Bank sees scope for faster customs procedures, fewer non-tariff barriers and better trade infrastructure to expand African value chains under the African Continental Free Trade Area. It also sees potential opportunities in energy, fertiliser and industrial inputs if firms relocate parts of their production networks. These opportunities depend on investment and execution. The Bank presents them as factors that could improve on its baseline.

Risks to the outlook, pp. 14–15

The Bank calls for stability and financing that supports productive investment

The Bank recommends targeted monetary and foreign-exchange policies to contain the impact of shocks and anchor inflation expectations, alongside coordination with fiscal policy. It urges oil and gas exporters to use part of their windfall to build buffers for the next downturn and diversify production and exports. It also recommends stronger revenue mobilisation and more efficient spending so fiscal consolidation can preserve essential services and productive investment.

The Bank connects the quality of external financing to what that financing pays for. It calls for distinguishing investment-driven import demand that can expand capacity from weak export receipts, and stable investment flows from borrowing that raises refinancing risk. It recommends timely debt disclosure, better portfolio management and oversight of public finances, and directing public investment towards projects that support growth. It also advocates public-private investment in digital infrastructure, more private investment in energy and transport, simpler regulation, and stronger energy and fertiliser supply security. These are the Bank’s recommendations from the final chapter.

Policy recommendations, pp. 16–17

ENCC interpretation

ENCC sees Egypt’s competitiveness test in whether the activities named by the Bank generate repeat demand that local producers can fulfil and collect on. A recovery in canal traffic can lift service receipts. Repeat contracts for maintenance, bunkering and logistics can show whether the gains reach suppliers as vessels return. In tourism, more guest nights could generate additional orders for domestic manufacturers. Actual purchasing volumes and orders outside the peak season can test that link. In technology exports, contract renewals, collections and job retention can help establish whether the activity generates recurring income.

The timing of cash flows also determines what firms gain. If a hotel supplier receives more orders while paying for materials upfront and waiting to be paid, its working-capital needs may rise before the recovery generates cash. If invoice values rise while volumes stay flat, repricing is a possible explanation to check before adding capacity. Orders should therefore be read alongside unit volumes, margins, days to collection and actual financing costs. Firms can apply the same logic to contracts with imported inputs by tracking unit-cost exposure to exchange rates and energy prices.

At economy level, three kinds of evidence merit reading together: real manufacturing value added, services receipts supported by activity volumes, and sustained domestic supplier orders and employment. Aligning periods and separating price changes from quantities helps assess whether the recovery is broadening the production base. The external-account and debt-service discussion adds a reason to monitor the currency and maturity of financing alongside the size of the flows. These are ENCC judgements and tests drawn from the edition’s argument. They do not assign regional figures to Egypt or add quantitative forecasts of their own.

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