Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) 2025 — Transparency International

1) Why does this release matter for Egypt?

CPI is among the most widely cited “governance and integrity indicators” in international discussions on public administration quality, policy effectiveness, investment attractiveness, business risk, and state resilience against waste and misallocation of resources. In this edition, the publisher goes beyond scores and links control of corruption to broader institutional and political features such as institutional independence, checks and balances, and protection of civic space, arguing that declines in basic freedoms often coincide with weakened anti-corruption environments.

For Egypt, reading the index should not be reduced to a single “number”; rather, it should be used as a diagnostic signal: where do institutional weaknesses accumulate? How can administrative and financial corruption risks be reduced in sectors with direct citizen impact (basic services and public spending)? What can be done to improve trust and transparency without resorting to “box-ticking” measures? These questions become more pressing in a global context where the publisher points to multiple pressures (economic/geopolitical/climate) that can tempt governments toward greater centralization of power and marginalization of oversight—weakening integrity mechanisms.

2) Data Card

• Official name: Corruption Perceptions Index 2025 (CPI 2025)
• Publisher: Transparency International
• Type: A global index with scores (and associated country ranking in the full release) — scale 0–100
• Coverage: 182 countries/territories — 13 independent data sources
• Publication context: Marked as under embargo until 10 February 2026, 07:01 CET
• Arab-region note: Palestine is not included this year due to not meeting the minimum threshold (3 sources) for assessment.

Official links as included in the publisher’s materials (listed without adding external sources):

www.transparency.org/cpi
www.transparency.org/en/cpi/2025

3) Methodology — How are results produced, and what does that imply for reading Egypt’s position?

The index aggregates “perceptions” of public-sector corruption across multiple independent sources (13 sources), then produces a final score for each country/territory on a 0–100 scale.

Key time-series comparability note:
The publisher notes that CPI exists since 1995, but methodology was updated in 2012 with the 0–100 scale; scores from 2012 onward are comparable (pre-2012 is not on the same basis).

What follows for Egypt?

• When comparing across years, comparisons should stay within 2012–2025 at minimum, and avoid treating pre-2012 values as a direct trend on the same scale.
• CPI is a perceptions index; it does not measure “proven corruption cases” but reflects assessments drawn from multiple sources—best used to identify “institutional risk/trend signals” and link them to verifiable reforms.

4) Main global trends — What does CPI 2025 say about the world?

4.1 A lower global average… and a widening footprint of weak performance

• The global average declined to 42/100 for the first time in more than a decade.
• 122 of 182 countries/territories score below 50, meaning most of the world still “fails” to keep corruption under control (per the publisher’s framing).
• The number of countries scoring above 80 has shrunk from 12 a decade ago to only 5 this year.

4.2 High performers align with strong institutions… low performance coincides with eroding checks

The report presents a clear relationship between control of corruption and the presence of strong independent institutions, free elections, and open civic space, contrasted with deteriorating performance in environments where oversight, transparency, and accountability are constrained.

4.3 Long-run score changes (since 2012)

The report summarizes that 31 countries improved, 50 declined, and 100 remained unchanged since 2012—indicating that sustained improvement is not the norm, and “stagnation or decline” is widespread.

5) Civic freedoms / civic space lens — the clearest analytical “message” in the 2025 report

A key addition in this edition is a quantitative comparison linking civic freedom (per CIVICUS Monitor) to average CPI scores. As reported:

• Open: 68
• Narrowed: 51
• Obstructed: 38
• Repressed: 32
• Closed: 30

The report concludes that as freedoms (expression/assembly/association/civic action) contract, average control of corruption declines, and that 36 of 50 countries with notable score declines also experienced civic space contraction.

6) Arab context — Where does the region stand, and where does Egypt stand?

6.1 Arab-region average and key features

• Arab-region average: 34/100.
• Methodological note: Palestine is not included this year due to not meeting the minimum required sources (3).

6.2 Selected Arab scores (as shown in the Arab-region map)

Relatively higher within the Arab context:

• UAE 69, Qatar 58, Saudi Arabia 57, Oman 52, Bahrain 50, Jordan 50.

Mid / below 50 within the Arab context:

• Kuwait 46, Morocco 39, Tunisia 39, Algeria 34.

Lower within the Arab context:

• Egypt 30, Iraq 28, Lebanon 23, Sudan 14, Libya 13, Yemen 13, Somalia 9, Syria 15… etc.

7) Egypt in CPI 2025 — confirmed facts from the publisher

• Egypt’s score: 30/100 (as shown in the Arab-region map for this edition).
• Egypt also appears among the countries scoring 30 in the report’s score table (within a group that includes, for example, Azerbaijan, Kenya, Mauritania, Peru… etc.).

What can be stated precisely?

• Egypt scores below the Arab-region average (34/100) on the publisher’s Arab map.
• The score of 30 aligns with the report’s broader message that many lower-scoring countries intersect with governance/civic space/oversight challenges, but the excerpts available here do not provide Egypt-specific analysis; therefore, ENCC’s reading relies on the report’s global signals without attributing country-specific details not explicitly stated.

8) Policy signals for Egypt — presentation-ready narrative (anchored in the report’s signals)

8.1 Protecting checks and balances and the independence of oversight institutions

• Problem: Gradual erosion of oversight and transparency makes anti-corruption “optional” and weakens corrective capacity.
• Proposed action: Strengthen the independence of oversight bodies and expand their practical access-to-information powers, linked to periodic publication of results.
• Expected benefit: Reduced waste risk, improved confidence in public spending, higher policy and service effectiveness.
• Report basis: The report links control of corruption to strong independent institutions and notes that politicization of justice and erosion of checks correlate with lower scores.

8.2 Making transparency the rule, not the exception (public spending, procurement, contracts)

• Problem: Poor management of public funds reflects in weaker services and higher financial/social risks.
• Proposed action: Proactive disclosure rules for procurement/contract/spending data, unified access platforms, and independent grievance/review mechanisms.
• Expected benefit: More efficient resource allocation, fewer conflicts of interest opportunities, improved service quality.
• Report basis: The report indicates that weak governance can lead to fiscal crises and poor services due to mismanagement of public funds.

8.3 Linking anti-corruption to protection of civic space and safe reporting

• Problem: Contraction of basic freedoms weakens societal oversight, investigative journalism, and whistleblower protection—allowing abuse of power to persist.
• Proposed action: Whistleblower protection measures, safeguarded space for civil/media oversight, and easier access to information.
• Expected benefit: Higher chances of early detection and a more sustainable deterrence environment.
• Report basis: Average CPI declines as civic space contracts; 36 of 50 declining countries also experienced civic space contraction.

8.4 Avoiding “centralization of power” as an automatic crisis response

• Problem: Using security/economic/geopolitical pressures to justify centralization can displace transparency and accountability.
• Proposed action: Ensure crisis management does not suspend parliamentary/societal oversight; any time-bound exceptions should be clearly defined, announced, and reviewed.
• Expected benefit: Preserving integrity during crises and reducing exploitation risk.
• Report basis: The report points to tendencies toward centralization and marginalization of checks in various contexts, treating transparency/accountability as “optional.”

8.5 Turning anti-corruption into a long-term reform track (not short campaigns)

• Problem: Partial or top-down reforms can reverse quickly if independent oversight is absent.
• Proposed action: A long-term institutional reform program including procedural updates, independent oversight, and periodic public impact assessments.
• Expected benefit: Cumulative improvements that can be sustained over time.
• Report basis: The report notes that long-run improvers typically adopted broad, durable legal and institutional reforms, and that efforts not subject to independent oversight can backslide.

9) Supporting quick tables (publication-ready)

Table (1) — Snapshot: Egypt within the Arab context (selected scores)

(Figures are from the publisher’s attached Arab-region map.)

Table (2) — The report’s “one-line message”: Civic space ↔ average CPI

10) Data notes & limitations

• Time comparability: Scores are comparable from 2012 onward under the updated methodology; pre-2012 is not on the same basis.
• What is available here for Egypt: The 30/100 score is confirmed from the Arab map and the score table, but rank and year-to-year change are not shown textually in the extracted excerpts here; therefore, they are not included to avoid unsubstantiated inference.
• Nature of the index: CPI measures “perceptions” of public-sector corruption across multiple sources; it is a comparative/diagnostic signal and should not be used alone to prove specific corruption cases.